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Backward induction is a benchmark of game theoretic rationality, yet surprisingly little is
known as to how humans discover and initially learn to apply this abstract solution concept
in experimental settings. We use behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data to study the way in which subjects playing in a sequential game of perfect
information learn the optimal backward induction strategy for the game. Experimental data
from our two studies support two main ﬁndings: First, subjects converge to a common
process of recursive inference similar to the backward induction procedure for solving the
game.The process is recursive because earlier insights and conclusions are used as inputs
in later steps of the inference. This process is matched by a similar pattern in brain acti-
vation, which also proceeds backward, following the prediction error: brain activity initially
codes the responses to losses in ﬁnal positions; in later trials this activity shifts to the
starting position. Second, the learning process is not exclusively cognitive, but instead
combines experience-based learning and abstract reasoning. Critical experiences leading
to the adoption of an improved solution strategy appear to be stimulated by brain activ-
ity in the reward system. This indicates that the negative affect induced by initial failures
facilitates the switch to a different method of solving the problem. Abstract reasoning is
combined with this response, and is expressed by activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex. Differences in brain activation match differences in performance between subjects
who show different learning speeds.
Keywords: neuroeconomics, game theory, backward induction, learning, deductive reasoning
1. INTRODUCTION
Backward induction (BI) is a recursive algorithm, wherein infer-
ences regarding a decision problem made at an earlier stage are
applied to the process of deriving yet further inferences on the
problem. As a mathematical construction, backward induction
constitutes a benchmark of game theoretic rationality that pre-
scribes the behavior of rational players in ﬁnite sequential games
of perfect information. In game theory, the concept is at the basis
of abstract theorems; most notably Zermelo’s (1908,1912) the-
orem on the existence of equilibria in pure strategies for those
games,orSelten’s(1965)andSeltenandStoecker’s(1986)theorem
characterizing Sub-game perfect equilibria.
Incontrasttoitsapplicabilityinmathematicalproofs,backward
induction has at times been considered inapposite as a descriptive
account of the cognitive processes operating in human subjects
during the sort of strategic interactions that game theorists would
conceptually represent as sequential games (e.g., Fey et al., 1996;
Aymard and Serra, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002). In part, backward
inductivereasoninghasbeenconsideredanunlikelydescriptionof
the human thought process during such game situations, because
it requires the cognitive enactment of a solution concept that
is considerably complex and ostensibly unnatural. However, we
ﬁnd evidence that subjects playing the sequential game of perfect
informationinourexperimenthaveacommonpatternoflearning
the optimal solution, and that although individuals may differ in
their speeds for producing this pattern, this path is common and
reproduces the steps of the backward induction algorithm.
To argue effectively this conclusion, we ﬁrst review what the
backward induction algorithm prescribes. We illustrate backward
inductioninﬁnitesequentialgames of perfect information. These
aregamesinwhichplayersalternateinactions,know,andremem-
ber precisely the choices made by other players in previous stages
of the game, and know exactly the payoff structure for all players
involved.A strategy for a player is a rule assigning a move at every
decision point. For these games, backward induction prescribes
the following procedure to construct a strategy for every player:
At the very last stage of the sequential game,when the ﬁnal player
makes the last choice of the game, she should move to maximize
her payoff from the choice made at this stage.We can call this step
the last stage. Since the game ends at the last stage, and because
payoffs are known, rationality prescribes the outcome of the last
player’schoice.Inotherwords,allplayers,includingthelastplayer
herself, can unambiguously determine what would constitute the
payoff maximizing choice given the options available at the last
stage. The second to last player should anticipate the unambigu-
ous criteria according to which the last player will choose, and
conclude that his second to last choice will ultimately yield the
payoffs induced by the optimal move of the last player. After this
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has been established, the original game is effectively replaced by a
gamewithshorterlengthwherethelastmoveiseliminatedandthe
payoffatthelaststageisdeﬁnedtobethepayofffollowingtheopti-
mal choice of the last player. Iterating this process until the initial
decision point is reached produces a strategy for every player.
Backward inductive reasoning relies in an essential way on
the human ability for recursive thought, which itself has been
posited as a prerequisite for quintessential human achievements
such as language acquisition and basic numeracy (Hauser et al.,
2002). Hence,to the extent that this innate human ability to think
recursively manifests itself in strategic games, there may indeed
exist a link between fundamental cognitive processes in humans
and the abstract game theoretic concept of backward induction.
Following this conjecture, we conduct two studies of a particu-
lar strategic social interaction that facilitates recursive learning.
These studies were designed to address two fundamental ques-
tions: First, what are the neural correlates of recursive learning
in the strategic environment, and second, how do the cogni-
tive processes involved in recursive learning connect to abstract
backward inductive reasoning.
2. EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
2.1. HIT-N GAME
The ﬁnite sequential game which subjects play in our experiment
is played by two parties on a virtual playing board, and is the
same as used in Gneezy et al. (2010), Bouton (1901–1902), and
Dufwenberg et al. (2009). The board used to display the game in
the imaging study is presented in Figure 1.
ForthebasicvariantoftheHit-Ngameusedinthisexperiment,
the ﬁrst player to move is allowed to move a single common play-
ing piece on the board,and she is allowed to move it only forward,
by 1, 2, or 3 positions; no more or no less. The move then goes to
the second player, who is allowed the same action of moving the
ﬁgure 1, 2, or 3 positions forward. From thereon the opportunity
to move according to the 1-2-or-3-only rule alternates between
the two players. The player who reaches the ﬁnal position (15 in
experiment 1) ﬁrst wins that game.We refer to this game as G(15,
3). A second game in our experiment involves the game G(17, 4)
which is played on a virtual playing board of length 17,and allows
players to move 1, 2, 3, or 4 positions forward.
We apply backward induction reasoning to this game to derive
the optimal strategy: Players moving in position 12, 13, or 14 can
win by reaching position 15 immediately. It follows that players
moving at 11 have lost, since they can only move to 12, 13, or 14,
where the opponent, as we have just seen, wins. Players can now
replace the original game with the shorter game where the ﬁrst
player to reach position 11 wins: a move is optimal in the original
game if and only if it is optimal in the reduced game. The same
argument, repeated, shows that the player who ﬁrst gets to posi-
tion 7 wins; after which it can be concluded that the ﬁrst to reach
3 wins. In summary, all positions different from 3, 7, and 11 are
winning positions, because from there the player who is moving
canreacheitherposition3,7,or11,andwin:shejusthastobesure
to move there. On the other hand,positions 3,7,and 11 are losing
positions, and there is not much that the player moving there can
do but hope for an error of the opponent. The argument we have
just presented is the BI solution to G(15, 3). A similar argument
shows that the losing positions in G(17, 4) are {2},{7}, {12}, and
the groups of winning positions are {1}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {8, 9, 10, 11},
{13, 14, 15, 16}.
2.1.1. The behavioral study
Weusedatafrom(Gneezyetal.,2010)asabehavioralsample,and
focus here on error rate, response time, and their relation. A total
of 72 subjects competed in 20 trials of G(15, 3), and 52 out of the
72subjectsplayedanadditional10trialsof G(17,4).Theincentive
structure for G(15,3) promised $5 for winning more than 5 trials
over the 20 game period,and $20 for winning more than 11 trials.
For G(17,4) subjects were promised $10 for winning more than 5
games.
FIGURE 1 | Board of positions for the game G(15, 3).This is the board
of positions used in the imaging experiment.The superimposed red
rectangles indicate the losing positions 3, 7 , and 11.The green rectangles
indicate the winning positions. In the lower section of the Figure 2
displays indicate the current score of the subject and the (computer)
opponent.
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2.2. THE fMRI STUDY
A total of 12 subjects participated in the MRI study. They played
ﬁrst 20 trials of G(15, 3), then 20 trials of G(17, 4) against a
computer. The game, incentives, and instructions include three
modiﬁcations to those used in the behavioral study. First,subjects
areinformedthattheyareplayingacomputer,programmedtowin
and subject to small errors. Also subjects play 20 trials of G(17,4)
(compared to 10 trials in study 1). Finally subjects were allowed
10s to make a choice on each of their turns.
Data were collected at the Center for Magnetic Resonance
Research(CMRR)atUniversityof Minnesotausinga3-TSiemens
Trio scanner. Both studies were approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at the University of Minnesota. Subjects in
both studies signed an informed consent form after they were
given the instructions.
3. MODEL
To motivate the need for a theoretical model and the structure
we are going to use, we begin by considering the relation between
two key observable variables, response time and error rate. The
response time is the length of the time interval between the
moment in which the move of the opponent (another player or
the computer) is observed and the moment in which the subject
makeshisnextmove.Todeﬁnetheerrorrate,wefocusonG(15,3)
and note that at every winning position one, and only one, of the
possiblemovesiscorrect,andtheothertwoareincorrect.Anerror
isthechoiceof thewrongmove,andtheerrorrateisthefrequency
of thisevent,conditionalonthepositionbeingawinningposition
for the subject (these are the only positions at which an error is
possible). The correct response rate is the difference from 1 of the
error rate.
How are these two variables related? It may be reasonable to
assume that, everything else being equal, a longer response time
is associated with a higher correct response rate. This for example
would be the case if the response time were varied exogenously,
since by thinking about the problem for a longer time the sub-
ject would be more likely to achieve a richer understanding of
what constitutes a good move. We point out that the condition of
everything else being equal is crucial for this assertion. Consid-
ering now, that the length of the response time is not exogenous,
but is decided upon by the subject who is reasoning about the
decision, the relationship between response time and error rate
may be different; indeed reversed: Since the reasoning activity can
be assumed – in some measure – costly, a decision maker may
compare and trade-off the estimated returns and costs from the
reasoning activity. If the returns are estimated to be low, he may
prefer to discontinue the process. If they are high, he might con-
tinue. Consider also, ability as an individual characteristic: An
individual with lower cognitive skills may ﬁnd the returns to his
reasoning unsatisfactory, stop early, and be more likely to make
thewrongchoice.Similarly,asubjectwhohasnotacquiredabasic
familiarity with the game may conclude very little from his exam-
ination, stop cognitively engaging, and commit errors at a high
rate. Both cognitive ability and problem familiarity are subsumed
undertheconceptof ability.Consideringresponsetimeasachoice
variable together with differences in ability,the average relation at
the individual level between response time and correct response
rate may therefore be negative. In our data we ﬁnd this to be the
case. Figure 2 illustrates this point.
The simple regression in Table 1 of the correct response rate
on the individual average response time conﬁrms the negative
relation,again in both games.
Given the observed relation it appears particularly useful to
consider a model in which response time is endogenously deter-
mined, and that reﬂects the notion that subjects choose to think
about a problem, decide whether to stop thinking, and only then
select a move.
3.1. OPTIMAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
In our experiment, at each turn, a player observes the position in
thegame,considersasetof potentialcuesandinsights,andtriesto
identifythebestmoveatthecurrentposition.Atanypointintime
before choosing a move, he can terminate the process and then
make a move determined by the conclusions reached up to this
point. If he does not terminate the process, he has to decide the
intensity of the effort devoted to the decision. The quality of his
decision will then depend on his ability to reason about the game
aswellashiseffortindoingso.Weconsiderabilityasanindividual
characteristic of the player, and this may describe both a player’s
natural, general skills, as well as her acquired understanding of
the game. We also consider effort as a choice variable. Ultimately,
both effort and ability contribute positively to the agent’s problem
solving success.
We model the above process as an optimal information acqui-
sition problem to be solved in the time interval before the move.
In the model, the subject has to choose an action, and has beliefs
over which of the feasible actions [for example, the set {1, 2, 3}
in G(15, 3)] in currently the best. In every instant during this
process the agent can observe an informative signal on what the
bestactionis,updateherbelief,anddecidewhethertocontinuethe
information acquisition process or to stop and choose what,given
thecurrentbelief,istheoptimalaction.Themodeloutlinedabove
constitutes a general inter-temporal decision problem which can
beformulatedasadynamicprogrammingproblemwithanaction
set that consists of the agent’s effort and the decision to continue
or stop processing information about the game. The state space
of the problem is the set of beliefs over the action set, assigning
to each action the probability that it is the best action. Informa-
tion acquired in every instant is a partially informative signal on
the true state; that is, on which among the feasible actions is the
optimal one.
3.2. MODEL PREDICTIONS
Itisclearthatif abilityissolowthatanyprocessedsignalisentirely
non-informative, the optimal time spent should be zero, and that
correct response rates in this case will consequently be low. This
is likely to occur in the early stages of the game,when subjects are
just beginning to familiarize with the task,and lack even the basic
insights to make even minor headway into the problem. At this
stage we should observe a short response time and a high error
rate. The effect should also be more pronounced at the difﬁcult
positions, those further from the end: this is because reasoning
about the best move can only produce useful insights when the
individual has some idea of what happens in later stages of the
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FIGURE 2 |Average response time and average correct rate.The averages are computed for each subject over the trials for the G(15, 3) (on the left) and
G(17 , 4) on the right.
Table 1 |Average response time and average correct rate OLS for both
games.
RT 15 (b/se) RT 17 (b/se)
Avg. correct G(15, 3) −8.581*** (1.766)
Avg. correct G(17 , 4) −8.633*** (1.797)
Constant 10.993*** (0.952) 11.010*** (1.017)
r2 0.252 0.316
N7 2 5 2
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
game, at positions closer to the end. In the initial rounds this
understanding of the game at later stages is lacking, and the sub-
ject may prefer to discontinue the reasoning soon because it is not
producing any useful insights.
At the opposite extreme, if ability is so large that the signal is
completely informative, only a short time will be necessary while
stillleadingtoahighcorrectresponserate.Thisislikelytooccurof
course at the late stages of the game,when a subject has an overall
understanding of the optimal strategy. It is also likely to occur at
the ﬁnal positions, where very simple reasoning can provide the
conclusion.
Betweenthesetwoextremes,wheresignalispartlyinformative,
the optimal policy will prescribe a positive response time. Overall
the relation between ability and response time is non-monotonic:
likely to be increasing for low values of ability, and decreasing for
higher values.
A speciﬁc conclusion of the model is that the response time at
a position is not necessarily monotonically increasing or decreas-
ing with experience,but might instead be ﬁrst increasing and then
decreasing.At the early stages,low experience,which corresponds
to low ability, induces an early stopping of the reasoning process
(the information acquisition in our model),a short response time
andahigherrorrate.Atintermediatestages,asthesubjectacquires
some basic understanding of the game, reasoning becomes more
informative,hence stopping is postponed. Finally,in later periods
theresponsetimedeclinesassubjectssimplyimplementasolution
algorithm which they now understand.
We will see that subjects’ behavior broadly matches these pre-
dictions, and provide the conceptual framework for the analysis
of the imaging data.
4. RESULTS
4.1. BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
We review the basic behavioral results presented in Gneezy et al.
(2010) to prepare for the analysis of the imaging data. To analyze
errorrate,wedeﬁneasubject’serrorj asasubject’sfailuretomove
the marker to j, whenever this is possible and moving to j is part
of the winning strategy. In G(15, 3) the possible errors of interest
are failures to move the marker to any of the positions 3, 7, 11,
or 15 whenever this would be possible. The error rate at j, ej,i s
the fraction of times the error is made over the times the subject
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could avoid the error. For example e3 is calculated as the number
of times the subject had the opportunity of moving her opponent
to position 3, yet failed to do so, divided by the times the subject
held the move at position 1 or 2 in the game. The average error
rate is the number of errors made at a winning position divided
by the number of times the subject was in a winning position.
Responsetimesforsubjectsshowamarkeddeclineacrosstrials
(see Figure3),with subjects requiring more than 8s on average to
make a choice during the ﬁrst three periods of the game, but not
even half of that during the last 3 periods.
Thereisasubstantialdifferenceintheevolutionof theresponse
time in the two games. Consider ﬁrst the game G(15,3):Note that
the ﬁrst trial has a very special role, since it is the one where sub-
jects get acquainted with the task,and the rules of the game. If we
ignore the ﬁrst trial we see that the response time increases from
the second to the fourth trial, and then declines, as the model
predicts.
For the ﬁrst trial of G(15,3) the error rate is 0.38,which is sig-
niﬁcantlylowerthantheaverageerrorratethatwouldbeexpected
ifchoicesweremaderandomly.Across20trialsofstudy1,theerror
rate steadily declines until it almost reaches zero: see Figure 4.
The four possible errors in G(15, 3) occur at signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent rates. No subject deviates from the winning strategy choice
at the ﬁnal 3 positions (e15 =0). Error rates and average period
marking the last occurrence of a particular error are lower for
positions closer to the game’s end (e3 ≥e7 ≥e11): see Figure 5.
Eachofthedifferencesbetweene3,e7,ande11 isstatisticallysig-
niﬁcant (p <0.01), and the pattern suggests that subjects indeed
learntoidentifylosingpositionsinasequentialmannerthatbegins
from the game’s ﬁnal positions. These observations indicate that
subjectsprogressthroughasequenceof minorrealizationstoward
FIGURE 3 | Response time. Average response time across trials in G(15, 3)
and G(17 , 4).The plot shows an unexpectedly long response time for the
very ﬁrst trial, which is driven by subjects’ response time at the initial onset
of the game (see also Figure 7). At the onset of the game subjects appear
to require additional time to familiarize themselves with the game
environment. Removing the initial position of the initial round produces an
increase in response time for G(15, 3) in line with model predictions.
becomingproﬁcientintheHitgame.TheabovetrendsforG(15,3)
replicateinG(17,4).Forbothgamesweobservelowererrorratesat
laterpositions,andanoveralldecreaseof errorratesoverrepeated
trials. Average response times decline across trials in both games.
Subjects make signiﬁcantly fewer mistakes in G(17, 4) than in
G(15, 3) indicating that subjects transfer some of their acquired
skill to the new game. Observing however, that only 20 out of 72
subjects manage to commit zero errors in G(17,4),it is likely,that
most subjects have not fully developed the explicit BI solution to
the sequential game after 20 trials of G(15, 3).
Figure 6 illustrates the average response time in the losing
positions, for each of the periods.
For position 11, the losing position which is closest to the end,
thehighestresponsetimeoccursintheﬁrstperiod,anddeclinesin
the periods thereafter. The peak for position 7 is reached at period
FIGURE4|E r r o rr a t eb yp e r iod. Average error by type for G(15, 3).
FIGURE 5 | Last trial for error. Whisker plot of trial during which the last
error occurred; separated by type.
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4,and that for position 3 is reached at period 5.As the model pre-
dicts, the response time is non-monotonic over the periods. For
example the response time in period 7 is low at the initial stages,
when subjects typically have a limited understanding of the game,
but increases as the insight that the position 11 is a losing position
is acquired and becomes available in the analysis of what to do at
position7.Inlaterperiodstheresponsetimeatposition7declines.
A similar relation can be seen in Figure 7, which illustrates the
average response time at winning positions for G(15, 3).
In this case too, the peak for the middle positions (winning
positions {4, 5, 6} and {8, 9, 10}) is reached after an initial low
value. The peak is reached at period 4 for {4, 5, 6} and at period
3 for {8, 8, 10}. The response time at the very ﬁrst positions {1,
FIGURE 6 | Response times in losing positions, G(15, 3). For each of the
20 periods in which the game G(15, 3) was played we report the average
response time at each of the losing positions, 3, 7 , and 11.
FIGURE 7 | Response times in winning positions. As in the previous
Figure 6 we report for each of the 20 periods in which the game G(15, 3)
was played the average response time at each of the four winning positions
groups.
2} increases slowly; the maximum is reached at period 8, after an
initial spike in period 1 which is likely to be due to the fact that
the very ﬁrst instance of position 1 is also the subjects’ very ﬁrst
encounter with the game. The response time at the easy positions
{12, 13, 14} monotonically declines after the initial period.
Theﬁgureswehaveseenpresentinstructiveaveragevaluesover
individuals’ response times. A more accurate description is pro-
videdbythepaneldataregressionsinTable 2 forG(15,3)gameand
Table 3 G(17, 4) for which the dependent variable is the response
time and the time variable for the panel is the index of the period.
The independent variables are dummy variables corresponding
to the groups of positions. They are indexed in increasing order
accordingtotheirpositionontheboard,lefttoright.Forexample,
the ﬁrst group of winning positions (Win Pos 1)i ng a m eG(15, 3)
indicates the set of positions {1, 2}. The second group of losing
positions for G(17,4) indicates the position 7. In both regressions
the variable dropped is the ﬁnal group of winning positions, that
is {10, 11, 12} for G(15, 3) and {13, 14, 15, 16} for G(17, 4).
The constant value is similar in both games, and around 4s.
The main effect of learning the game is estimated by the vari-
ables period and period square , indicating a signiﬁcant and fast
Table 2 | Response time in G(15, 3): panel data analysis.
RT151(b/se) RT152 (b/se) RT153 (b/se)
Win pos 1 1.472*** (0.447) 1.293*** (0.432) 1.299*** (0.432)
Win pos 2 2.979*** (0.446) 2.690*** (0.432) 2.679*** (0.432)
Win pos 3 3.095*** (0.456) 3.009*** (0.442) 3.005*** (0.442)
Losing pos 1 4.223*** (0.499) 4.820*** (0.484) 4.849*** (0.484)
Losing pos 2 6.726*** (0.474) 6.946*** (0.459) 6.969*** (0.459)
Losing pos 3 1.280*** (0.466) 1.299*** (0.451) 1.306*** (0.451)
Period −0.381*** (0.021) −0.561*** (0.088)
Period square 0.009** (0.004)
Constant 3.800*** (0.396) 7 .801*** (0.447) 8.460*** (0.544)
r2
N 5044 5044 5044
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Table 3 | Response time in G(17, 4): panel data analysis.
RT171 (b/se) RT172 (b/se) RT173 (b/se)
Win pos 1 2.972*** (0.920) 2.957*** (0.886) 2.958*** (0.874)
Win pos 2 3.307*** (0.904) 3.140*** (0.870) 3.066*** (0.859)
Win pos 3 2.711*** (0.913) 2.653*** (0.879) 2.637*** (0.868)
Losing pos 1 2.866*** (0.984) 3.327*** (0.948) 3.420*** (0.936)
Losing pos 2 4.078*** (0.943) 4.205*** (0.908) 4.262*** (0.896)
Losing pos 3 0.802 (0.926) 0.773 (0.891) 0.774 (0.880)
Period −0.964*** (0.091) −3.110*** (0.359)
Period square 0.204*** (0.033)
Constant 3.866*** (0.694) 8.429*** (0.797) 12.565*** (1.033)
r2
N 1442 1442 1442
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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[particularly in the game G(17, 4)] decline over time. The other
variables conﬁrm what we have seen in the aggregate analysis of
the ﬁgures. Most notably, the increase in response time at losing
positions is signiﬁcantly higher than the one induced by winning
positions; making more likely the conjecture that subjects carry
over into the analysis of positions further from the end, insights
theyhaveobtainedfromthelosingposition11,andpossiblysearch
for equivalent insight among positions earlier in the game.
4.2. THE fMRI DATA
4.2.1. Expected activation patterns and regions of interest
Onthebasisofthemodelandtheanalysisofthebehavioraldatawe
can formulate hypotheses to be tested in the study of the imaging
data.
Learning of the method of backward induction should begin
with the negative affective response experienced with moving at
position 11, and realizing that the game is lost at that point.
This experience should involve the reward system, particularly
the Striatum (Schultz et al., 1997). We explore this hypothesis
in section 4.3.
The predicted striatal response should be stronger, and occur
earlier with subjects for whom behavioral evidence indicates that
they posses a better understanding of the optimal strategy. We
explore this hypothesis in section 4.4.
Further, the analysis of behavioral data has shown longer
response times at the losing positions of game G(15,3). The brain
activation at these three positions should be similar, but should
occur at different points in time during the experimental ses-
sion. Brain activation should involve both areas associated with
reward system and areas involved in abstract reasoning. We test
this hypothesis in section 5 (see in particular in Figure 11).
One of our main assertions is, that the affective response
induced by the understanding that the game is lost at position
11 should occur together with activation of frontal areas involved
in planning, particularly VLPFC (Crescentini et al., 2011). This
hypothesis is also examined in section 4.5.
In what follows we present results obtained from an event-
related random effects general linear model (rfxGLM) with 16
predictors.Predictorsaredummyvariablesindicatingthe7setsof
positions for G(15, 3) over the ﬁrst 10 trials (Early) and the last
10trials(Late).Adummyvariableindicatingthecomputer’sturn,
and a constant term complete the model. The omitted variable
corresponds to a resting period between trials. Unless explicitly
stated, all results reported here are signiﬁcant at an uncorrected
threshold of p ≤0.005; t(11)≥3.59 for the full sample, or with
t(5)≥4.77 when split into Fast and Slow Learners. Fast Learners
aredeﬁnedasthe6subjectswiththelowestaverageerrorrateover
both games. These are incidentally also the 6 subjects with the
most wins in G(15, 3). Correspondingly, Slow Learners are the 6
subjects with the highest average error rates.
The model and observed behavior suggests that subjects
become proﬁcient at the Hit-15 game via a sequence of insights
pertaining to their experience at losing positions; the generic
manifestation of which is the avoidance of the losing position
at 11, followed by avoidance of position 7, and for some sub-
jects avoidance of position 3. These adaptations, which are likely
accompaniedby(conscious)realizationofthesepositionsaslosing
positions happen at dramatically varying rates between subjects,
and have critical relation to models of prediction error processing
and temporal difference learning (see e.g., Schultz et al., 1997,
or Daw et al., 2010). According to models of prediction error-
basedlearning,unexpectedoccurrencesof losingpositionsshould
be accompanied by corresponding BOLD signal change in areas
involved with prediction error (PE) tracking, such as the Stria-
tum (Schultz et al., 1997) and Insula (Preuschoff et al., 2008). We
expect to see these PE responses whenever subjects ﬁrst realize
that a given position is a losing position, and also when subjects
are unexpectedly placed onto an already identiﬁed losing posi-
tion; both of which necessitate a yet incomplete understanding of
the game, when played against a reasonably proﬁcient opponent
such as the computer program used for this study. This expecta-
tion follows, because prediction error responses should become
less pronounced as subjects gain greater insight into the game as
a consequence of their increased ability to accurately predict the
gamesoutcome.Hence,oncethegame’slosingpositionshavebeen
identiﬁed,ﬁndingoneself atasubsequentlosingpositionbecomes
almost perfectly predictable at earlier stages,wherefore prediction
errors should eventually approach zero.
4.3. PREDICTION ERROR RESPONSE IN THE STRIATUM AND INSULA
All subjects in the fMRI sample learn to identify position 11 as a
losing position at some point during the game. In agreement with
the idea that the identiﬁcation of position 11 as a losing position
inducesanactivationintherewardsystem,weﬁndsigniﬁcantdif-
ferences in striatal activation for subjects considering a move at
losing position 11 compared to when considering a move at win-
ningposition{1,2}.Thedifferenceinactivationisinthedirection
of a negative prediction error, and an illustration is provided in
Figure 8. (See also Appendix for time course graphs of BOLD
activation).
Figure 8 also shows signiﬁcant positive activation of the left
and right Insula at coordinates (41, 19, 3), as subjects perceive
the near inevitability of losing the game at position 11. This acti-
vation is consistent with the Insula’s involvement in processing
negative affect,and it’s role in signaling negative prediction errors
(Seymour et al.,2004)
4.4. PREDICTION ERROR RESPONSE FOR FAST LEARNERS
Given our main interest in the neural signature of the sequential,
recursive way in which subjects learn the solution to the Hit-N
game,we concentrate in Figure9 on the Fast Learners; those sub-
jects who actually manage to quickly reduce the amount of errors
they make in the game.
The left panel of Figure 9 contrasts activation at position 11
to activation at position {1, 2} for Fast Learners. Consistent with
theroleof theStriatuminsignalingpredictionerrors,weﬁndthat
subjects show a strong initial negative response in the Striatum at
losing position 11 during the ﬁrst 10 rounds,which diminishes or
disappears during the last 10 rounds. Figure 10C shows that this
change of Striatal activity for Fast Learners is statistically signif-
icant at an uncorrected threshold of p ≤0.005, [t(5)≥4.77]. At
the same threshold, we observe signiﬁcant activity in the Insula
during both time periods.
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FIGURE8|B r a i nactivity at the losing position 11 in G(15, 3). Contrast
obtained from a GLM with 16 predictors on all 12 subjects. In the GLM we
use the same 7 groupings for positions in the game, and differentiate
between positions during the ﬁrst (early) and last (late) 10 trials, for a total
of 14 predictors. An additional predictor for computer choices and a
constant term describe the full model.The contrast used in the ﬁgure
shows activation when the current position is 11 during both early and late
trials compared to activation at positions {1, 2} during early and late trials.
The map shows activation at a false discovery rate q <0.05.
Our analysis also shows strong activity in the Insula at position
7 compared to {1, 2} during early trials, and eventually activ-
ity in the Striatum at position 7 during late trials; indicating a
shift of the prediction error from position 11 to position 7; the
sequence – as we have already shown – in which subjects learn the
losing positions.
Figure 10 provides support to the above observations by over-
laying the contrasts of early and late activity at position 11 (com-
pared to {1, 2}) for both Fast and Slow learners. Slow learners
exhibit detectable striatal activation in direction of a prediction
erroronlyduringthelast10trials;consistentwiththeobservation
that these subjects learn the game according to the same general
pattern,butataslowerpace,thansubjectsclassiﬁedasFastLearn-
ers. However, the direct test of the effects of Early/Late periods,
Fast/Slow learners, and the interaction term of these classiﬁca-
tions, shown in Table 4, did not identify a statistically signiﬁcant
effect for the interaction (p =0.158).
4.5. EXPERIENCE-BASED LEARNING AND ABSTRACT REASONING
The center image of Figure 10C identiﬁes a cluster of voxels
in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC; 47, 40, 3) with
FIGURE9|P r o g r ession of activation at losing position 11 for fast
learners. GLM and contrasts as for Figure 8, but limited to Fast Learners.
strong positive activation during the early losing position for Fast
Learners. We are left to investigate the activity in this area when
subjects are in losing positions for the game G(15, 3).
Our analysis of losing positions,illustrated in Figure11,shows
statistically signiﬁcant increases of activation in the VLPFC at all
of the losing positions during G(15,3). Given this region’s associ-
ation with tasks requiring spatial imagery in deductive reasoning
(see Knauff et al.,2002 or Crescentini et al.,2011) the observation
of higher activity during losing positions is of particular interest,
as it indicates the special contribution that the experience of a los-
ing position seems to make toward subject’s progress in learning
the game.
Figure11showsoverlappingregionsof activationforalllosing
positions experienced by Fast Learners that is most pronounced
at position 11, and least pronounced at position 3; once again
highlighting the critical nature of the initial losing position 11 for
subject’s learning experience with the game.
5. CONCLUSION
We have explored how subjects learn to play the Hit-N game, and
how this process converges for all subjects to learning the optimal
strategywiththemethodof backwardinduction.Wefoundstrong
evidence for a sequential learning process in which subjects learn
the losing positions at the game’s end ﬁrst. We showed that the
behavioral characteristics (in error rate and response time) of this
sequentiallearningprocessareconsistentwithabasicsearchmodel
in which subjects choose an optimal search effort conditional on
their ability and associated search costs.
Wehavealsoshownaneuralpatternof activationinthebrain’s
reward system, including the Insula and Striatum, that mirrors
the behaviorally implied pattern of subjects learning to identify
losing positions from the game’s end. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the rate at which subjects learn to identify losing positions is
also reﬂected by a differential onset of prediction error response
between Fast and Slow Learners. A critical ﬁnding of our study
is the implication of the prefrontal cortex in subject’s progres-
sion toward ﬁnding the solution to the Hit-N game. Here we ﬁnd
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FIGURE 10 | Progression of activation in fast and slow learners.
(A) Contrast obtained from a GLM with 16 predictors on 6 subjects
classiﬁed as Slow Learners.The depicted contrast shows activation at
position 11 compared to activation at position 1, 2 during late trials.
p <0.005 uncorrected, t >4.77 . (B) Same model as (A).The depicted
image subtracts the contrast obtained for positions 11 vs {1, 2} in late
periods from the contrast obtained for those positions during early
periods. Positive identiﬁcation of Striatum in this contrast, is driven by a
more strongly negative activation at position 11 in late periods for Slow
learning subject. (C) 12 predictor GLM for 6 subjects classiﬁed as Fast
Learners. As in (B), we show the subtraction of the contrast (11 early-1,
2 early)–(11 late-1, 2). We ﬁnd activation in Medial Prefrontal Gyrus
(MPFG), VLPFC, and Striatum. Negative identiﬁcation in Striatum is
driven by a more strongly negative response at position 11 during early
trials for Fast Learners. p <0.005 uncorrected for all images depicted
here.
Table 4 | Interaction between fast/slow learner, and early/late trial on
BOLD signal contrast position 11 – position {1, 2} in Striatum.
Perc. BOLD (b/se)
Dummy for fast learners −0.09366 (0.08354)
Dummy for ﬁrst 10 periods 0.15197 (0.32534)
Interaction term 0.17345 (0.11814)
Constant 1.02843*** (0.23005)
r2 0.2144
N2 4
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
that activity in VLPFC is higher at losing positions than at corre-
sponding winning positions. Taken together, these ﬁndings point
toward a cognitive process in which the affective experience of a
losing position feeds critically into the subject’s abstract cognitive
engagement with the task.
While most of our discussion concentrated on subject’s success
in recursively learning to identify losing positions in the Hit-N
game,itisclearthatsuchaprocess–althoughenablingsubjectsto
master any length Hit-N game – is not equivalent to an abstract,
explicit understanding of the BI solution to the game; one which
could be transferred instantaneously to other similar games, such
as G(17, 4). We see then, in both of our studies, that most sub-
jects,despitequicklybecominghighlyproﬁcientinG(15,3),failto
instantaneously achieve proﬁciency in G(17, 4). Instead, subjects
require an abbreviated learning period also for the second game.
What seems remarkable about the transition of behavior from
G(15, 3) to G(17, 4) is that subjects, even without ostensibly
having explicit knowledge of the BI solution at the time they
begin G(17, 4), nonetheless commit fewer errors, and require a
shorter learning phase for the theoretically more difﬁcult second
game. This observation provides strong indication that the recur-
sive learning algorithm that enables learning of G(15, 3) is also a
contributor to the development of a precursory understanding of
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FIGURE 11 | Fast learners at the losing positions. Contrast for Fast
Learners during ﬁrst 10 periods at p <0.005.The contrasts used are for
each of the three losing position, compared to the predictor given by the
game being in position {1, 2}. For example the contrast for the position 3
indicates the comparison between position 3 and position {1, 2}.The top
panel shows the clusters in VLPFC activated for the different contrasts.
The lower panel shows the activation for the contrasts (3,{1, 2}), (7 ,{1, 2}),
and (11,{1, 2}). Activation in VLPFC is not found in Fast Learners during the
last 10 rounds, and Slow Learners show it only during the last 10 rounds
for 11-{1, 2}. As shown in Figure 5, Fast Learners do not make mistakes
past round 10, while Slow Learners commit mistakes even at position e11
past round 10. It should be also noted here that a direct test of the
interaction between subjects’ categorization as Fast/Slow Learner and a
dummy variable indicating Early/Late trials did not yield a statistically
signiﬁcant effect (p =0.158 two-sided, seeTable 4). We believe that the
failure to identify such an effect at conventional signiﬁcance level in our
data may be due to small sample size, and an insufﬁciently precise
measure of when subjects learn the game.
thegame’sabstractsolution.Oneimplicationofthisﬁndingisthat
complex cognitive insights, such as understanding that backward
inductivereasoningprovidesasolutiontothegeneralHit-Ngame,
can arise from the interaction of experience-based reward system
responsesandabstractreasoningwithinarelativelysimplemodel.
The fact that an experience-based understanding derived from
playing G(15, 3) is effective in improving subject’s performance
in G(17,4) suggests that at least some higher-order cognition and
insights might be motivated and prepared by joint activity in the
brain’s reward system and prefrontal cortex.
6. MATERIALS AND METHODS
6.1. MRI DATA ACQUISITION
High resolution anatomical images were acquired ﬁrst, using a
Siemens t1-weighted 3D ﬂash 1mm sequence. Then, functional
images were acquired using echo planar imaging with Repetition
Time(TR)2000ms,EchoTime(TE)23ms,ﬂipangle90˚,64×64
matrix,38 slices per scan,axial slices 3mm thick with no gap. The
voxel size was 3mm×3mm×3mm.
The data were then preprocessed and analyzed using Brain
Voyager QX 2.1. The anatomical images were transformed into
Talairach space in 2 steps: ﬁrst the cerebrum was rotated into
anterior commissure – posterior commissure (AC-PC) plane
using trilinear transformation, second we identiﬁed 8 reference
points (AC, PC, and 6 boundary points) to ﬁt the cerebrum into
the Talairach template using trilinear transformation. We pre-
processedfunctionaldatabyperformingslicescantimecorrection,
3D movement correction relative to the ﬁrst volume using trilin-
ear estimation and interpolation,removal of linear trend together
with low frequency non-linear trends using a high-pass ﬁlter.
Next, we co-registered functional with anatomical data to obtain
Talairachreferencedvoxeltimecourses,towhichweappliedspatial
smoothing using a Gaussian ﬁlter of 7mm.
GLM MODELS
fMRI analysis was performed in Brain Voyager QX version 2.1.
Contrasts obtained for G(15, 3) are based on the results of an
event-related general linear model with random effects using 16
predictors. Seven predictors signify the period in which a subject
contemplates any of the positions {1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7}, {8, 9,
10},{11},{12,13,14}duringtheﬁrst10trialsof G(15,3).Another
7 predictors signify the same position during the last 10 trials. An
additional predictor for times in which the computer is moving
and an intercept term describe the model. Contrasts obtained for
G(17,4) are based on the results of an event-related general linear
model with random effects using 16 predictors. Seven predictors
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signify the period in which a subject contemplates any of the
positions {1}, {2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {7}, {9, 10, 11}, {12}, {13, 14, 15, 16}
during the ﬁrst 10 trials of G(17, 4). Another 7 predictors signify
thesamepositionduringthelast10trials.Anadditionalpredictor
for times in which the computer is moving and an intercept term
describe the model.
6.3. FAST AND SLOW LEARNERS
The fMRI study consists of 12 subjects. For analysis comparing
Fast and Slow Learners in G(15,3),subjects were split into groups
according to their overall error rate (a subject is slow if the error
rate is larger than 40%), which also constitutes a splitting accord-
ing to Wins in G(15,3) (a subject is slow if the number of wins in
that game is less than ﬁve). Both are median values, but they are
also values at which there is a large change of performance.
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APPENDIX
The following ﬁgures show time series plots of percentage BOLD
signal change in the game G(15, 3) for clusters deﬁned by the
contrast of positions 11-{1, 2}, using t=4.5, cs=100. The x-axis
represents positions in G(15, 3).
In graphs comparing early (ﬁrst 10) and late (last 10) trials,
error bars are for the mean condition over all 20 trials.
FIGUREA1 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
FIGUREA2 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
FIGUREA3 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
FIGUREA4 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
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FIGUREA5 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
FIGUREA6 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
FIGUREA7 |Time series of percentage BOLD change for G(15,3).
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